AI-Native Security Risks in Enterprise Chatbot Deployments

Why Traditional Penetration Testing Fails to Secure AI Interfaces

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Executive Summary

A targeted eight-day security assessment was conducted against a production AI chatbot operated by a major enterprise in the Asia-Pacific region. The engagement covered both traditional application testing and AI-specific attack surfaces, including behavioural testing and output validation controls that standard penetration testing frameworks do not address.

During testing, we were able to:

- Impersonate the chatbot by exploiting an Access Control based vulnerability.
- Inject enterprise-branded content appearing to originate from the AI.
- Force the chatbot interface to render externally hosted files
- Manipulate AI-generated output formatting through LLM Output Handling vulnerabilities.
- Trigger high-risk eligibility confirmation through Prompt Injection / LLM Misinformation.

Of the eight findings identified, two are AI-native (LLM Output Handling, Prompt Injection—both with no CVEs or automated detection methods), one traditional-high enabling AI impersonation (Broken Access Control), and five traditional vulnerabilities increasing overall exposure.

The highest severity finding was a broken access control vulnerability. The server trusted the client to identify who was sending each message. An attacker who compromises a user's session could modify this field to make their message appear as if it came from the official chatbot. A second vulnerability could be triggered through conversational manipulation.

The risks identified were not failures of the AI model itself. They were failures in how trust, identity, and authority were implemented around it.

Together, these findings demonstrate a broader reality: traditional penetration testing methodologies are not designed to detect AI-native risks. As enterprises deploy AI interfaces into production environments, security programmes must extend traditional testing to assess the integrity of trust within AI-driven systems.



Figure 1. Problem flow illustrating how architectural weaknesses enable unauthorised content injection.

The Trust Equation

Consumers do not extend equal trust to everything they see on a screen. Over time, they have learned to distrust unsolicited emails, ignore pop-ups, and treat links with caution. AI chatbots occupy a fundamentally different position in that mental model.

By design, chatbots emulate human conversation, respond in real time, and present themselves as helpful representatives of an organisation. Users do not perceive them as generic interfaces. They perceive them as customer service agents. This places chatbots in the same psychological trust category as human support staff—a position that has traditionally been exploited through social engineering techniques that leverage authority and credibility.

When a chatbot speaks, it speaks as the organisation. It carries the brand's voice, the company's authority, and the implicit assurance that what it says is accurate and official. In many deployments, it has access to the same data as a human agent, sometimes more. Customers ask the same questions they would ask a human agent. They follow its instructions. They act on its confirmations.

This trust is not accidental. It is the product. Enterprises deploy AI chatbots precisely because users engage with them differently than with static web pages or automated systems. Trust is the value.

Which also makes it the most valuable thing an attacker can compromise.

Enterprise Chatbots as a New Security Category

Across the Asia-Pacific region, enterprises have rapidly deployed AI chatbots to support customer service, account inquiries, and operational requests. These systems increasingly sit on the front line of customer interaction, handling sensitive personal data and influencing financial and operational outcomes.

Security assessment practices have evolved to cover traditional vulnerabilities effectively, but a critical gap remains. Traditional penetration testing frameworks were designed for deterministic systems: applications

where behaviour is fixed, responses are predictable, and authority is enforced through code paths. These methodologies successfully identify classical vulnerability classes such as authorisation flaws, injection vulnerabilities, and API security issues.

AI chatbots, however, introduce a second attack surface that traditional frameworks were not designed to assess. Their behaviour is shaped by probabilistic language models, conversational context, and dynamic output generation.

The consequence: organisations may receive thorough traditional security assessments while AI-specific behavioural and output handling controls remain unexamined.

Engagement Overview

The assessment was conducted over eight days against a production, customer-facing AI chatbot deployed by a major enterprise in the Asia-Pacific region.

The engagement followed established security testing standards, including OWASP, NIST, and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES). These methodologies were extended to include testing for AI-native attack surfaces. Testing focused on the full interaction chain between client, application backend, and AI layer, with particular attention to how trust and authority were established, validated, and enforced across that chain.

The objective was not to compromise the AI model itself, but to evaluate how the system behaved under realistic adversarial conditions that exploit trust, conversation flow, and interface assumptions.

Three Strategic Risk Categories

While the engagement identified eight individual findings, they fall into three strategic risk categories that are most relevant to executive decision-makers.

Trust Architecture Failures (HIGH)

The most severe risk identified was a classical authorisation vulnerability—Broken Access Control—that carries AI-specific exploitation consequences.

The backend system trusted client-supplied metadata included in message POST requests, specifically the role attribute and the attachments array. This vulnerability class is not AI-specific; trusting client-supplied authority fields is a well-documented authorisation flaw in traditional web applications. By intercepting and modifying the request body to set "role": "admin" and inject a crafted attachments object, an attacker could cause arbitrary messages to render as if they originated from the official chatbot.

What makes this finding significant in an AI context is not the vulnerability class itself, but the exploitation consequence: AI impersonation. Users extend unique trust to AI messages, treating them as authoritative organisational statements. An attacker exploiting this traditional authorisation flaw gains not just elevated privileges, but the voice of the AI itself.

Externally hosted files could be displayed as legitimate chatbot attachments within the trusted interface. These messages and attachments were indistinguishable from genuine system-generated content.

Although exploitation requires possession of a valid user session or JWT, this represents a significant authorisation flaw. Message authority and attachment rendering were derived entirely from user-controlled fields rather than authenticated server-side context.



Figure 2. Chatbot impersonation via client-side role manipulation.



Figure 3. POST Request body indicating the payload used



Figure 4. Screenshot indicates the fake AI message and attachment

Impact

An attacker who compromises a user session could impersonate the chatbot and exploit the trust users place in the interface. This enables the delivery of malicious files, phishing payloads, malware distribution, or the manipulation of trust-based conversations using fabricated authoritative messages. The chatbot's integrity as an official enterprise communication channel is directly undermined.

AI Output as an Attack Surface (MEDIUM)

Several findings demonstrated that AI-generated outputs were treated as authoritative system content without sufficient validation or constraint.

LLM Output Handling/Markdown Injection

The chatbot rendered large-language-model outputs containing Markdown syntax directly into the chat interface without sanitisation. When prompted with formatting instructions, the chatbot generated structured content (for example, Markdown level-1 headings) that was rendered as styled UI elements.

This is a fully AI-native vulnerability class: LLM Output Handling/Markdown Injection. This demonstrates that AI-generated output was treated as inherently safe and rendered without governance, allowing attackers to influence layout, visual hierarchy, and presentation within the interface.



Figure 5. Screenshots indicate the ability to inject arbitrary Markdown level 1 heading into chatbot display

Figure 6. Screenshots indicate the chatbot's response in WebSocket

Prompt Injection and LLM Misinformation

The chatbot could be manipulated through conversational prompting to generate authoritative-sounding statements confirming eligibility for service credits, account adjustments, or service entitlements without verifying account details such as transaction ID or customer name.

Although the model initially refused to provide such confirmations, repeated or strategically phrased prompts resulted in official-looking policy confirmations. No backend verification occurred.



Figure 7. Policy-related prompts



Figure 8. Policy related prompts requesting service credit

Impact

These behaviours enable in-application social engineering. Users could present AI-generated confirmations as “proof” to frontline staff, potentially leading to financial loss, operational abuse, or unauthorised benefits. The vulnerability lies not in model compromise but in allowing AI output to carry system authority without validation.

Data and Control Plane Leakage (MEDIUM–LOW)

Additional findings increased the overall risk posture by expanding the attack surface and amplifying the impact of higher-severity issues.

During OTP-gated workflows, the chatbot communicated via WebSocket. Following authentication, the backend transmitted payloads containing personally identifiable information, including user first names, despite the UI explicitly stating such information could not be displayed for privacy reasons.

This represents an API Security – Broken Object Property-Level Authorisation (BOPLA). The backend transmitted more object properties than the business process required-a traditional API security vulnerability, not an AI-specific risk.

Under Singapore's PDPA data minimisation requirements, transmitting personal data that the business process does not require represents potential regulatory non-compliance, regardless of whether the data is displayed in the interface.



Figure 9. The first name associated with the account was displayed in the WebSocket

Persistent cross-site scripting vulnerabilities and missing HTTP security headers further reduced defence-in-depth, increasing the exploitability of other findings.

Why Traditional Penetration Testing Misses Critical AI Risks

Six of the eight findings fall within traditional security testing scope: broken access control, XSS, API security, and security misconfiguration. Standard penetration testing methodologies are designed to find these vulnerability classes. The two AI-native findings require different assessment approaches.

Automated scanners cannot reason about conversational context or detect when behaviour guardrails erode under sustained adversarial pressure. Static analysis tools cannot identify when AI-generated output is treated as verified system content without proper sanitisation. CVE-based risk management programmes cannot track or prioritise risks that have no CVE identifiers. Traditional testing asks whether a system can be broken.

AI-native security must ask whether a system can be misled.

The most severe finding in this engagement—broken access control enabling AI impersonation—would be detected by traditional penetration testing. What traditional testing misses is the behavioural and output handling layer where AI-specific risks live. This explains why organisations may receive clean security reports for the application layer while AI-specific attack surface remain unassessed.

What an AI-Native Security Model Requires

Securing enterprise AI chatbots requires recognising the AI layer as a distinct attack surface.

Key requirements include:

- **Server-owned authority:** never derive trust or role from client input
- **Output governance:** treat AI output as untrusted until validated
- **Separation of assistance and authority:** AI may assist, not confirm
- **Data minimisation by design:** transmit only what is strictly required
- **Defence in depth:** maintain baseline web security controls
- **Conclusion: The Real Risk Is Misplaced Trust**

The vulnerabilities documented in this engagement are not unique. They reflect common architectural patterns in modern AI chatbot deployments. The most dangerous failures did not involve advanced exploits. They involved systems behaving as designed—speaking helpfully and authoritatively—without controls to ensure that authority was legitimate or that AI-generated output was properly validated before being treated as trusted application content.

AI chatbots succeed because users trust them. That trust is the asset. It is also the attack surface.

Organisations deploying AI-driven customer interfaces must extend traditional security testing with AI-native assurance models that explicitly account for trust, authority, and output legitimacy.

A post-remediation retest should be conducted prior to continued or expanded production use. Security is not a one-time gate. As AI interfaces evolve and expand in scope, assurance models must keep pace.

About THEOS Cyber Offensive Security

THEOS Cyber Solutions Offensive Security practice surfaces vulnerabilities before an attacker does, going beyond checklists to expose weaknesses that automated tools miss.

Our Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing (VAPT) engagements identify weaknesses across your perimeter, internal networks, cloud, and web applications, prioritised by business impact.

Our Red Teaming operations replicate persistent threat actors to test how far an attacker could get and whether your team can detect and respond, revealing coverage gaps, detection blind spots, and response readiness. Every engagement delivers actionable reporting and practical steps to strengthen your security posture.